Some Background on Schwartz's Philosophies

[Edman85]

It may be a bit of a stretch to relate all of Schwartz's philosophies with this article, but Schatz and Schwartz have done a lot of research together, and you will probably see some of this implemented.

http://www.footballoutsiders.com/info/FO-basics

Football Outsiders Basics (a.k.a. "Pregame Show")

by Aaron Schatz

While reading Football Outsiders, or our book Pro Football Prospectus, new readers will often come across an offhand comment about, for example, the idea that fumble recovery is not a skill, and wonder what in the heck we are talking about. In Pro Football Prospectus 2008, we include an essay called "Pregame Show" which gives a basic look at some of the most important precepts that have emerged during five years of Football Outsiders research. That essay is republished here, along with links to the original research online when possible, or mentions of where that research appeared in print.

Please note that some of our basic research findings, such as the split between offense, defense, and special teams, were never addressed in one specific article, but instead developed over time. Therefore, there is no specific article we can point out.
You run when you win, not win when you run.

The first article ever written for Football Outsiders was devoted to debunking the myth of "establishing the run." There is no correlation whatsoever between giving your running backs a lot of carries early in the game and winning the game. Just running the ball is not going to help a team score; it has to run successfully.

There are two reasons why nearly every beat writer and television analyst still repeats the tired oldschool mantra that "establishing the run" is the secret to winning football games. The first problem is confusing cause and effect. There are exceptions -- usually involving the Indianapolis Colts without Bob Sanders -- but, in general, winning teams have a lot of carries because their running backs are running out the clock at the end of wins, not because they are running wild early in games.

The second problem is history. Most of the current crop of NFL analysts came of age or actually played the game during the 1970s. They believe that the run-heavy game of that decade is how football is meant to be, and today's pass-first game is an aberration. As we addressed in an essay in last year's book on the history of NFL stats, it was actually the game of the 1970s that was the aberration. The seventies were far more slanted towards the run than any era since the arrival of Paul Brown, Otto Graham, and the Cleveland Browns in 1946. Optimal strategies from 1974 are not optimal strategies for today's game.

A sister statement to "you have to establish the run" is "team X is 5-1 when running back John Doe runs for at least 100 yards." Unless John Doe is ripping off six-yard gains LaDainian Tomlinson-style, the team isn't winning because of his 100-yard games. He's putting up 100-yard games because his team is winning.

* The Establishment Clause, July 2003

A great defense against the run is nothing without a good pass defense.

This is a corollary to the absurdity of "establish the run." If you don't believe us, meet our good friends the 2006-2007 Minnesota Vikings. With rare exceptions, teams win or lose with the passing game more than the running game -- and by stopping the passing game more than the running game. The reason why teams need a strong run defense in the playoffs is not to shut the run down early, it's to keep the other team from icing the clock if they get a lead. You can't mount a comeback if you can't stop the run.

Note that "good pass defense" may mean "good pass rush" rather than "good defensive backs."

Running on third-and-short is more likely to convert than passing on third-and-short.

On average, passing will always gain more yardage than running, with one very important exception: when a team is just one or two yards away from a new set of downs or the goal line. On third-and-1, a run will convert for a new set of downs 36 percent more often than a pass. Expand that to all third or fourth downs with 1-2 yards to go, and the run is successful 40 percent more often. With these percentages, the possibility of a long gain with a pass is not worth the tradeoff of an incomplete that kills a drive.

This is one reason why teams have to be able to both run and pass. The offense also has to keep some semblance of balance so they can use their play-action fakes, and so the defense doesn't just run their nickel and dime packages all game. Balance also means that teams do need to pass occasionally in short-yardage situations; they just need to do it less than they do now. Teams pass roughly 60 percent of the time on third-and-2 even though runs in that situation convert 20 percent more often than passes. They pass 68 percent of the time on fourth-and-2 even though runs in that situation convert twice as often as passes.

* 'Tis Better to Have Rushed and Lost Than Never to Have Rushed at All, January 2004
* Pro Football Forecast 2004, Buffalo chapter
* Pro Football Prospectus 2005, Detroit chapter

Standard team rankings based on total yardage are inherently flawed.

When you open your newspaper on Sunday morning, you'll see that the little agate-type previews of each game list team rankings by total yardage. That is still how the NFL "officially" ranks teams, but these rankings rarely match up with common sense. That is because total team yardage may be the most context-dependent number in football.

It starts with the basic concept that rate stats are generally more valuable than cumulative stats. Yards per carry says more about a running back's quality than total yardage, completion percentage says more than just a quarterback's total number of completions. The same thing is true for teams; in fact, it is even more important because of the way football strategy influences the number of runs and passes in the game plan. Poor teams will give up fewer passing yards and more rushing yards because opponents will stop passing once they have a late-game lead and will run out the clock instead. For winning teams, the opposite is true. Did Detroit really have a better passing game than San Diego or New England in 2006, or did the Lions have more passing yards because they went 3-13 and thus threw the ball more than any team except for Green Bay, while the Chargers and Patriots were a combined 26-6 and spent a lot of time killing the clock with the running game?

Total yardage rankings are also skewed because some teams play at a faster pace than other teams. New Orleans had nearly 200 more passing yards than Indianapolis in 2006, but were the Saints really a better offense than the Colts? The Saints ran 183 offensive drives, while the Colts had just 148. No other team in the league had fewer than 160 offensive drives. If you gave Peyton Manning another 35 drives, he would probably rack up more than 200 passing yards.

* Pro Football Prospectus 2005, Cleveland chapter
* Pro Football Prospectus 2005, New York Jets chapter

A team will score more when playing a bad defense, and will give up more points when playing a good offense.

This sounds absurdly basic, but when people consider team and player stats without looking at strength of schedule, they are ignoring this. In 2004, Carson Palmer and Byron Leftwich had very similar numbers, but Palmer faced a much tougher schedule than Leftwich did. Palmer was better that year, and better in the long run.

In 2007, Oakland running back Justin Fargas had four games with at least 115 rushing yards. Those games came against the teams ranked 31st (Miami), 30th (New York Jets), 29th (Houston), and 26th (Denver) in defensive DVOA against the run. On the other hand, he gained only 41 yards on 15 carries against Green Bay, ranked eighth, and only 58 yards on 22 carries against Minnesota, ranked first.

Because players and teams don't give the exact same performance every week, this is more of a general law, and it doesn't necessarily apply in the short term. Sometimes the short term lasts a whole year -- for example, if you are the 2006 Jacksonville Jaguars.

* Pro Football Prospectus 2005, Cincinnati chapter

If their overall yards per carry are equal, a running back who consistently gains yardage on every play is more valuable than a boom-and-bust running back who is frequently stuffed at the line but occasionally breaks a long highlight-worthy run.

Our brethren at Baseball Prospectus believe that the most precious commodity in baseball is outs. Teams only get 27 of them per game, and you can't afford to give one up for very little return. So imagine if there was a new rule in baseball that gave a team a way to earn another three outs in the middle of the inning. That would be pretty useful, right?

That's the way football works. You may start a drive 80 yards away from scoring, but as long as you can earn 10 yards in four chances, you get another four chances. Long gains have plenty of value, but if those long gains are mixed with a lot of short gains, you are going to put the quarterback in a lot of difficult third-and-long situations. That means more punts and more giving the ball back to the other team rather than moving the chains and giving the offense four more plays to work with.

The running back who gains consistent yardage is also going to do a lot more for you late in the game, when the goal of running the ball is not just to gain yardage but to eat clock time. If you are a Chicago Bears fan watching your team with a late lead, you don't want to see three straight Matt Forte stuffs at the line followed by a punt. You want to see a game-icing first down.

A common historical misconception is that our preference for consistent running backs means that "Football Outsiders believes that Barry Sanders was overrated." Sanders wasn't just any boom-and-bust running back, though; he was the greatest boom-and-bust runner of all time, with bigger booms and fewer busts. Our play-by-play database only goes back to 1995, but Sanders led the league in rushing DYAR for 1996 and was second behind Terrell Davis in 1997.

Rushing is more dependent on the offensive line than people realize, but pass protection is more dependent on the quarterback himself than people realize.

Some readers complain that this idea contradicts the previous one. Aren't those consistent running backs just the product of good offensive lines? The truth is somewhere in between. There are certainly good running backs, such as Edgerrin James since his move to the Arizona Cardinals, who suffer because their offensive lines cannot create consistent holes. Most boom-and-bust running backs, however, contribute to their own problems by hesitating behind the line whenever the hole is unclear, looking for the home run instead of charging forward for the four-yard gain that keeps the offense moving.

As for pass protection, some quarterbacks have better instincts for the rush than others, and are thus better at getting out of trouble by moving around in the pocket or throwing the ball away. Others will hesitate, hold onto the ball too long, and lose yardage over and over.

Note that "moving around in the pocket" does not necessarily mean "scrambling." In fact, a scrambling quarterback will often take more sacks than a pocket quarterback, because while he's running around trying to make something happen, a defensive lineman will catch up with him.

* Passing: Fun With Sacks, Part II, December 2003
* Rushing: Anything written about the Arizona Cardinals during 2006

Shotgun formations are generally more efficient than formations with the quarterback under center.

In 2007, offenses gained 5.9 yards per play from shotgun, but just 5.1 yards per play with the quarterback under center. In 2006, the difference was even greater, with 6.4 yards per play from shotgun and just under 5.0 yards per play with the quarterback under center. This wide split exists even if you analyze the data to try to weed out biases like teams using shotgun more often on third-and-long, or against prevent defenses in the fourth quarter. Shotgun offense is more efficient if you only look at the first half, on every down, and even if you only look at running back carries rather than passes and scrambles.

Clearly, NFL teams have figured the importance of the shotgun out for themselves. In 2007, for the first time, every single team ran at least eight percent of their plays from shotgun, and the average team used shotgun 27 percent of the time, a huge jump over the 19 percent average of 2006. The 2007 Patriots were the first team in our records to use shotgun on more than half their offensive plays. It is likely that if teams continue to increase their usage of the shotgun, defenses will adapt and the benefit of the formation will become less pronounced.

* Pro Football Prospectus 2007, Tampa Bay chapter

A running back with 370 or more carries during the regular season will usually suffer either a major injury or a loss of effectiveness the following year, unless he is named Eric Dickerson.

Terrell Davis, Jamal Anderson, and Edgerrin James all blew out their knees. Larry Johnson broke his foot. Earl Campbell and Eddie George went from legendary powerhouses to plodding, replacement-level players. Shaun Alexander broke his foot and became a plodding, replacement-level player. This is what happens when a running back is overworked to the point of having at least 370 carries during the regular season.

The "Curse of 370" was expanded in Pro Football Prospectus 2006 to include seasons with 390 or more carries in the regular season and postseason combined. Research also shows that receptions don't cause a problem, only workload on the ground.

Plenty of running backs get injured without hitting 370 carries in a season, but there is a clear difference. On average, running backs with 300 to 369 carries and no postseason appearance will see their total rushing yardage decline by 15 percent the following year and their yards per carry decline by two percent. The average running back with 370 or more regular-season carries, or 390 including the postseason, will see their rushing yardage decline by 35 percent, and their yards per carry decline by eight percent.

Research in Pro Football Prospectus 2008 suggests that overuse in college does not create a problem for top prospects, but also shows that players chosen after the first round rarely have a successful NFL career after a college season over 330 carries.

* Ricky Williams is Pretty Much Screwed, July 2004
* 370 Carries Revisited, Seattle chapter of Pro Football Prospectus 2006, republished online January 2007
* Pro Football Prospectus 2008, Detroit chapter

Wide receivers must be judged on both complete and incomplete passes.

We don't yet know enough to precisely parse the blame for incomplete passes, but we know that wide receiver catch rates are as consistent from year to year as quarterback completion percentages. From 2001 to 2005, Hines Ward caught more than 60 percent of intended passes every year, whether from Kordell Stewart, Tommy Maddox, or Ben Roethlisberger. Plaxico Burress, playing with the same quarterbacks as well as Eli Manning, has never caught more than 60 percent of intended passes.

* Ch-Ch-Chambers, December 2006, Boston Sports Media Watch

The total quality of an NFL team is three parts offense, three parts defense, and one part special teams.

There are three units on a football team, but they are not of equal importance. Our DVOA ratings provide good evidence for this. The special teams ratings are turned into DVOA by comparing how often field position on special teams leads to scoring compared to field position and first downs on offense. After figuring out these numbers, the top ratings for special teams are roughly one-third as high as the top ratings for offense or defense.

Offense is more consistent from year to year than defense, and offensive performance is easier to project than defensive performance. Special teams is less consistent than either.

Nobody in the NFL understands this concept better than Indianapolis Colts general manager Bill Polian. Both the Super Bowl champion Colts and the four-time AFC champion Buffalo Bills of the early 1990s were built around the idea that if you put together an offense that can dominate the league year after year, eventually you will luck into a year where good health and a few smart decisions will give you a defense good enough to win a championship. (As the Colts learned in January 2007, you don't even need a year, just four weeks.) Even the New England Patriots, who are led by a defense-first head coach in Bill Belichick, have been more consistent on offense than on defense since they began their run of success in 2001.

* Turnovers and the Unpredictability of Defense, April 2004
* Mentioned in 2005 DVOA Projections, September 2005

Field-goal percentage is almost entirely random from season to season, while kickoff distance is one of the most consistent statistics in football.

This theory, which originally appeared in the New York Times in October 2006, is one of the our most controversial, but it is hard to argue against the evidence. Measuring every kicker from 1999 to 2006 who had at least ten field goal attempts in each of two consecutive years, the year-to-year correlation coefficient for field-goal percentage was an insignificant .05. Mike Vanderjagt didn't miss a single field goal in 2003, but his percentage was a below-average 74 percent the year before and 80 percent the year after. Adam Vinatieri, supposedly the best kicker in the game, has never has never had two straight seasons with accuracy better than last year's NFL average of 83 percent.

On the other hand, the year-to-year correlation coefficient for kickoff distance, over the same period as our measurement of field-goal percentage and with the same minimum of ten kicks per year, is .61. The same players consistently lead the league in kickoff distance, particularly Neil Rackers, Olindo Mare, Josh Brown, and for the last two years, Stephen Gostkowski.

* "NFL Kickers Are Judged on the Wrong Criteria," New York Times, November 12, 2006
* Pro Football Prospectus 2007, Arizona chapter

Recovery of a fumble, despite being the product of hard work, is almost entirely random.

Stripping the ball is a skill. Holding onto the ball is a skill. Pouncing on the ball as it is bouncing all over the place is not a skill. There is no correlation whatsoever between the percentage of fumbles recovered by a team in one year and the percentage they recover in the next year. The odds of recovery are based solely on the type of play involved, not the teams or any of their players.

Fans like to insist that specific coaches can teach their teams to recover more fumbles by swarming to the ball. Chicago's Lovie Smith, in particular, is supposed to have this ability. However, since Smith took over the Bears, their rate of fumble recovery on defense went from a league-best 76 percent to a league-worst 33 percent in 2005, then back to 67 percent in 2006. Last year, they recovered 57 percent of fumbles, close to the league average.

Fumble recovery is equally erratic on offense. In 2006, the Detroit Lions fumbled 21 times on offense and recovered just four of those fumbles. Last year, the Lions fumbled 29 times on offense--but actually had fewer turnovers because they recovered 16 of those fumbles.

Fumble recovery is a major reason why the general public overestimates or underestimates certain teams. Fumbles are huge, turning-point plays that dramatically impact wins and losses in the past, while fumble recovery percentage says absolutely nothing about a team's chances of winning games in the future. With this in mind, Football Outsiders stats treat all fumbles as equal, penalizing them based on the likelihood of each type of fumble (run, pass, sack, etc.) being recovered by the defense.

Other plays that qualify as "non-predictive events" include blocked kicks and touchdowns during turnover returns. These plays are not "lucky," per se, but they have no value whatsoever for predicting future performance.

* Pro Football Prospectus 2005, New Orleans chapter

Field position is fluid.

Every yard line on the field has a value based on how likely a team is to score from that location on the field as opposed to from a yard further back. The change in value from one yard to the next is the same whether the team has the ball or not. The goal of a defense is not just to prevent scoring, but to hold the opposition so that the offense can get the ball back in the best possible field position. A bad offense will score as many points as a good offense if it starts each drive five yards closer to the goal line.

A corollary to this precept: The most underrated aspect of an NFL team's performance is the field position gained or lost on kickoffs and punts. This is part of why Devin Hester has such an impact on the game, even when he isn't returning a kickoff or punt for a touchdown.

* How Many Points is a Turnover Worth?, September 2003
* Also, see the book The Hidden Game of Football by Pete Palmer, Bob Carroll, and John Thorn

Teams which are strong on first and second down, but weak on third down, will tend to improve the following year. Teams which are weak on first and second down, but strong on third down, will tend to decline the following year.

We discovered this when creating our first team projection system in 2004. It said that the lowly San Diego Chargers would have of the best offenses in the league, which seemed a little ridiculous. But looking closer, our projection system treated the previous year's performance on different downs as different variables, and the 2003 Chargers were actually good on first and second down, but terrible on third.

Teams get fewer opportunities on third down, so third-down performance is more volatile -- but it's also is a bigger part of a team's overall performance than first or second down, because the result is usually either very good (four more downs) or very bad (losing the ball to the other team with a punt). Over time, a team will play as well in those situations as it does in other situations, which will bring the overall offense or defense in line with the offense and defense on first and second down.

This trend is even stronger between seasons. Struggles on third down are a pretty obvious problem, and teams will generally target their off-season moves at improving their third-down performance ... which often leads to an improvement in third-down performance.

* Pro Football Prospectus 2005, San Diego chapter
* "Third Down is the Charm for NFL Turnarounds", New York Times, August 2005

By and large, a team built on depth is better than a team built on stars and scrubs.

The Redskins went into 2006 with a Super Bowl-quality starting lineup, and finished 5-11 because they had no depth. You cannot concentrate your salaries on a handful of star players because there is no such thing as avoiding injuries in the NFL. Every team will suffer injuries; the only question is how many. The game is too fast and the players too strong to build a team based around the idea that "if we can avoid all injuries this year, we'll win."

* Pro Football Prospectus 2008, "The Injury Effect"

Long article... More to Come, at which point I'll post some of the linked articles.

[Edman85]

Continued...

Running backs usually decline after age 28, tight ends after age 29, wide receivers after age 30, and quarterbacks after age 32.

This research was originally done by Doug Drinen (editor of Pro-Football-Reference.com). In recent years, a few players have had huge seasons above these general age limits (most notably Tiki Barber, Tony Gonzalez, and Corey Dillon), but the peak ages Drinen found a few years ago still apply to the majority of players.

During the summer of 2007, ESPN The Magazine asked us to research when players decline at "non-skill" positions. This research was not as rigorous as our usual work, and needs a little more attention before we're ready to stand by it. For the curious, however, the preliminary results said that defensive ends and defensive backs generally begin to decline after age 29, linebackers and offensive linemen after age 30, and defensive tackles after age 31.

* Offensive age estimates based on How Important is Age? by Doug Drinen, written in 2000.

The future NFL success of quarterbacks chosen in the first two rounds of the draft can be projected with a high degree of accuracy by using just two statistics from college: games started and completion percentage.

This theory was introduced in Pro Football Prospectus 2006 and further refined in Pro Football Prospectus 2007. The projection created by these stats is known as the Lewin Career Forecast, after the creator of the theory, David Lewin.

Scouts expected players such as Kyle Boller (48 percent), Jim Druckenmiller (54 percent) and Ryan Leaf (54 percent) to suddenly figure out how to complete passes once they hit the NFL. It isn't surprising that it didn't happen. Having a high completion percentage (above 60 percent or so) is no guarantee of success, especially if it was done in a small number of games in a fluky system (Tim Couch being a strong example), but it is a prerequisite for it. Games started are important because the more film that exists of a player in game conditions, the easier it is to find weaknesses that might come out against different opponents or different schemes. When scouts don't get sufficient information, they place too much weight on "measureables" and off-field workouts, and make mistakes like Couch (26 starters), Leaf (24 starts) or Akili Smith (19 starts).

The Lewin Career Forecast only applies to the first two rounds because it assumes that with enough game film to judge, scouts can accurate identify players who are "system quarterbacks" and will not succeed in the NFL, and those players appropriately fall on draft day (Colt Brennan being a good example from 2008).

From 1996-2005, the worst quarterback drafted in the top two rounds who had 37 or more college starts and a completion rate above 60 percent was Eli Manning. When the worst projection belongs to a quarterback who just led a two-minute drill to finish off a historic Super Bowl upset, that's a good projection system.

* College Quarterbacks Through the Prism of Statistics, March 2006
* Pro Football Prospectus 2006, "Projecting College Quarterbacks"
* Pro Football Prospectus 2007, "Projecting College Quarterbacks Revisited"

Championship teams are generally defined by their ability to dominate inferior opponents, not their ability to win close games.

Football games are often decided by just one or two plays -- a missed field goal, a bouncing fumble, the subjective spot of an official on fourth-and-1. One missed assignment by a cornerback, or one slightly askew pass that bounces off a receiver's hands and into those of a defensive back five yards away and the game could be over. In a blowout, however, one lucky bounce isn't going to change things.

Championship teams beat their good opponents convincingly and destroy the cupcakes on the schedule. Certainly there are exceptions to this rule, including the past two Super Bowl champions. Unless this becomes a trend that lasts four or five years, it is hard to say this rule no longer exists.

* Guts and Stomps, December 2005

Finally, one bit of research we forgot in the PFP 2008 "Pregame Show" essay:
Teams with more offensive penalties generally lose more games, but there is no correlation between defensive penalties and losses. The penalty that correlates highest with losses is the False Start, and the penalty that teams will have called most consistently from year to year is the False Start.

* Pro Football Prospectus 2007, St. Louis chapter

For more on Football Outsiders, see the introduction to our statistical methods as well as the Football Outsiders FAQ.

[number20]

Pound the rock!

[cruzer1]

I remember how everybody used to complain about how Barry Sanders needed to get more carries, but he had plenty of carries. He was also freakish in that he didn't take many hits at all.

[bosman]

wow i got a headache now but if thats the plan i like it

[JonBenke]

Well, for what it's worth .. Matthew Stafford looks his best when in the shotgun.

[number20]

Originally Posted by cruzer1

I remember how everybody used to complain about how Barry Sanders needed to get more carries, but he had plenty of carries. He was also freakish in that he didn't take many hits at all.

Yeah, so true. Except for maybe the Mouse Davis days.

Still have that NFL Films short Barry Bio I taped off of TV that ran 2-3 days after he announced his retirement... "..he wasn't the fastest....he wasn't the biggest...he was simply the hardest. Running back. To tackle. <dramatic pause> Ever."

[Edman85]

Re: College QB's

Stafford: 57.1%, 31 GS
Sanchez: 64.3%, 16 GS
Freeman: 59.1%, 33 GS
Davis: 60.3%, 34 GS
Harrell: 69.8%, 39 GS

I'm beginning to think Stafford may not be the guy...

[Johnny Mac]

Originally Posted by Edman85

Re: College QB's

Stafford: 57.1%, 31 GS
Sanchez: 64.3%, 16 GS
Freeman: 59.1%, 33 GS
Davis: 60.3%, 34 GS
Harrell: 69.8%, 39 GS

I'm beginning to think Stafford may not be the guy...

Sanchez was surrounded by 5 star talent at every position. Stafford also played in the SEC and played MUCH better defenses than the other teams.

[syrett4]

Wow. That was long but very interesting. I never really thought about football in those terms. Obviously 3rd and short is better than 3rd and long, but I love the research and the detail in this.

This guy is really our coach right? This isn't a joke?

Pass me the Kool-Aid.

[Johnny Mac]

Originally Posted by Edman85

Re: College QB's

Stafford: 57.1%, 31 GS
Sanchez: 64.3%, 16 GS
Freeman: 59.1%, 33 GS
Davis: 60.3%, 34 GS
Harrell: 69.8%, 39 GS

I'm beginning to think Stafford may not be the guy...

Also Stafford improved each year, 52.7% as a FR, 55.7% as a SO and 61.4 % as a JR. If he sat his first two years like Sanchez did, his career completion percentage would be comparable

[sinister porpoise]

Cutler completed less than 60% of his passes in the SEC, Manning completed 60.3% as a senior at Tennessee, etc etc

[Johnny Mac]

Originally Posted by sinister porpoise

Cutler completed less than 60% of his passes in the SEC, Manning completed 60.3% as a senior at Tennessee, etc etc

Matt Ryan completed under 60% of his passes his last year at BC

[Edman85]

http://www.footballoutsiders.com/sta...ishment-clause

14 Jul 2003
The Establishment Clause

by Aaron Schatz

Fixed with slightly more accurate numbers, 7-15-04

It has always been the conventional wisdom of pro football: establish the run. Winning teams run early. They use the run to set up their passing game later. Even if they don't get too many yards on the ground early, winning teams need to keep running to wear the defense down. Take at the NFL's leaders in team rushing yards, and you'll see a list of winning teams.

Other football pundits have an alternative theory. They say that winning teams pad their rushing totals by running out leads in the fourth quarter. Losing teams, even those with good running backs, spend the second half passing the ball in order to try to catch up. At the end of the season, even those winning teams that don't run the ball well end up with lots of yards because they've run the ball a lot at the end of games.

By looking at 2002 play-by-play data, we should be able to figure out which of these axioms is true. Do teams that run the ball early win more games? Or do winning teams, no matter whether they run more or pass more early, gain many of their rushing yards late in games while running out the clock?

Before we evaluate how teams establish the run, we have to isolate the plays that make up the running game. So for this analysis, I've removed all carries by players other than running backs and fullbacks. When coaches talk about establishing the running game, they don't mean end-arounds or quarterback scrambles. Well, maybe that's what Dan Reeves means, but everyone else is talking about the running backs.

Once we've removed the quarterback scrambles, the occasional wide receiver carry, and a few muffed (or faked) punts, this becomes the list of the top ten running games in the NFL in 2002:
1) Miami 2143 yards
2) Denver 2052 yards
3) Kansas City 1887 yards
4) NY Giants 1844 yards
5) San Diego 1831 yards
6) San Francisco 1811 yards
7) Minnesota 1798 yards
8) Green Bay 1783 yards
9) Jacksonville 1749 yards
10) Washington 1682 yards

Boy, tell me it doesn't surprise you to see Steve Spurrier's offense on this list.

A look at the top rushing teams doesn't do much for the idea that running the ball is the key to success in today's NFL. As you may know by now, only one of the NFL's top individual rushers made the playoffs: Tiki Barber of the Giants. Looking at the top ten running back totals by team adds two more playoff teams: San Francisco, with their well-regarded tandem of Garrison Hearst and Kevan Barlow, and Green Bay, where Ahman Green battled injuries but had some talented backups, namely Tony Fisher. But the average record of the teams on this list is about 8-8.

Now that we know which teams got the most yards overall, we can take a look at the teams that did the most to establish the run early. Establishing the run early means running the ball consistently from the very beginning. The adage about establishing the run has always held that you keep calling rushing plays, even if they don't succeed, in order to set up your offense later in the game.

So here are the five teams in the NFL that did the most to establish the run – the five teams with the most first quarter rushing attempts by running backs:
1) Tennessee 110 carries
2t) Houston 108 carries
2t) San Francisco 108 carries
4) Cleveland 106 carries
5) Dallas 101 carries

Yes, that's right. Only Tennessee worked harder than the lowly expansion Texans at establishing the running game in the first quarter. Doesn't look like it helped Houston win many games, though, and didn't do much for that other team from Texas either. Three playoff teams here, but two duds as well, and none of the NFL's top backs are represented – although the two-headed monster of Hearst and Barlow was as potent as any one back in the NFL.

So what about the other side? Here are the teams that did the least to establish the run in the first quarter:
28) New England 84 carries
29) Tampa Bay 83 carries
30) St. Louis 82 carries
31) Detroit 80 carries
32) Oakland 71 carries

They say you need to run early to win, but Bill Callahan isn't listening, because the 11-5 Oakland Raiders ran, far and away, the fewest running plays in the first quarter. This list has only two playoff teams, but given that Cleveland got the wild card on tiebreaker -- despite the same 9-7 record as the Patriots -- I think you can call the two lists even.

OK, some may argue, it doesn't really matter if the Texans try to establish the run. If you don't have a good running back and a good line, there is nothing to establish. So let's look at the top five teams for running back yards in the first quarter:
1) Denver 537 yards
2) Miami 472 yards
3) San Diego 467 yards
4) Buffalo 462 yards
5) Washington 457 yards

Ladies and gentlemen, the "just missed the playoffs" all-stars! The five teams that gained the most yards on the ground in the first quarter all finished between 7-9 and 9-7, and none made the postseason.

On the other side, the five teams with the fewest yards on the ground in the first quarter do help to support the conventional wisdom that those who do not gain on the ground to start the game are doomed to failure:
28) Chicago 299 yards
29) New England 283 yards
30) Cincinnati 279 yards
31) Carolina 264 yards
32) Baltimore 259 yards

Four losing teams, and one 9-7 squad whose fans spent the whole year calling for more of the running game. Then again, teams that don't get a lot of offense early, rushing or passing, aren't likely to win a lot of ballgames.

So if playoff teams aren't running up all those yards early in games while they are establishing the run, when are they getting them? The flip side of the "establish the run" argument says that winning teams have a lot of rushing yards because they are running out leads in the fourth quarter. So here are the five teams that led the NFL in fourth-quarter rushing attempts from running backs in 2002:
1) Philadelphia 124 carries
2) Miami 121 carries
3t) Pittsburgh 116 carries
3t) Carolina 116 carries
3t) Kansas City 115 carries

Now that looks like a list of winning football teams, although I'm not sure how Carolina got in there. Continue this list to the top ten, and you add five playoff teams: Tennessee, Oakland, the Giants, Green Bay, and Atlanta. Yes, that same Oakland team that ran only 72 times in the first quarter, when it was establishing its offense, ran 111 times in the fourth quarter, when it was grinding down the clock.

As you would expect, the bottom of this list reveals five of the NFL's poorest teams from 2002:
28) Cincinnati 80 carries
29) Houston 78 carries
30) Arizona 73 carries
31) Chicago 72 carries
32) Detroit 67 carries

So far, evidence would seem to suggest that establishing the run isn't really that important for winning games in today's NFL. The evidence also seems to back those who say that winning teams build their rushing totals while running out their leads. But in the interest of space, I've given a lot of top five and bottom five lists. What about the other 22 teams?

As it turns out, looking at all 32 teams together reinforces what we've seen so far: that more rushing attempts early don't indicate a winning team, but rushing attempts late do.

Statisticians have a concept called the correlation coefficient that measures how much one variable influences another variable. A correlation of 1 means the two variables are completely connected; 0 means they have no connection.

The correlation between first quarter rushing attempts and team wins is a measly .171. That means there is almost no connection between running a lot in the first quarter, and winning a lot of games. The correlation between fourth quarter rushing attempts and team wins, on the other hand, is .750. That's a sizeable relationship.

By the way, the correlation for first quarter rushing yards and team wins is a bit higher, though still not substantial, at .260. The correlation for fourth quarter rushing yards and team wins is a much lower, at .486. So early in games, it is more important to gain yards than just to run the ball for the heck of it, but at the end of the game the number of runs is more important than how many yards they gain.

To show how winning teams build their rushing statistics by running out the clock with a lead, here are the top ten NFL teams in rushing when a) leading by 14 or more in the third quarter, or b) leading by 7 or more in the fourth quarter. Along with the total yards they gained running out their leads, I've included what percentage of their total running game this represents, with the average of all 32 NFL teams being 15%.
Miami 552 yards 26%
Oakland 550 yards 36%
Philadelphia 540 yards 34%
Tampa Bay 422 yards 29%
Tennessee 348 yards 23%
New England 332 yards 25%
Denver 319 yards 16%
Green Bay 316 yards 18%
Pittsburgh 314 yards 20%
Atlanta 309 yards 20%

That's a pretty good list of wining football teams. Seven of these teams made the playoffs, and the other three went 9-7 and missed the playoffs by tiebreaker. But while all winning teams pad their rushing totals by running out the clock when leading late in games, those yards don't necessarily represent the same amount of the running game for all winning teams. Philadelphia and Oakland got more than one-third of their rushing yards while running out the clock, but Denver and Green Bay built much more of their rushing total earlier in games.

Incidentally, the playoff team with the fewest rushing yards in these "run out the clock" situations? Indianapolis, with only 93 yards: a mere 7% of their rushing total.

So in 2002, at least, the axiom that teams need to establish the run early to win did not hold true. Some teams won by running early. Other teams won without running early. It also appears that teams with high rushing totals aren't necessarily establishing their running game from the first snap onwards -- but when a winning football team has a high rushing total, it is very likely they got many of those yards while running out the clock.

[Edman85]

Also, nothing about it in that article, but punts on 4th and 1 or inside the opponent's 40 are borderline insane and in most cases decrease your team's chances of winning a game.

[KingMoore]

Originally Posted by syrett4

This guy is really our coach right? This isn't a joke?

Pass me the Kool-Aid.

No he isn't. He is someone our new coach has consulted with.

[sportz4life]

Originally Posted by Johnny Mac

Also Stafford improved each year, 52.7% as a FR, 55.7% as a SO and 61.4 % as a JR. If he sat his first two years like Sanchez did, his career completion percentage would be comparable

awe cmon JMac..all that talent and it isn't really too difficult to improve on 52.7% and 55.7% is it..damn McCoy was over 70%..you guys drink too much Stafford koolaid..ball velocity and a pretty release isn't everyhting..Mike McMahon had a heck of an arm and lots of mobility..lot of good that did him..

[Johnny Mac]

Originally Posted by sportz4life

awe cmon JMac..all that talent and itisn;t really too difficult to imporve on 52.7% and 55.7% is it..damn McCoy was over 70%..youguys drink too much Stafford koolaid..ball velocity and a pretty release isn't everyhting..Mike McMahon had a heck of an arm and lots of mobility..lot of good that did him..

Chase Daniel completed 70% of his passes too, so by your logic I guess we should draft him

[Hongbit]

I just pray the guy doesn't talk about "putting out great tape" in tomorrow's press conference.

[sportz4life]

Originally Posted by Johnny Mac

Chase Daniel completed 70% of his passes too, so by your logic I guess we should draft him

Not my point..but the fact you are ready to spend 50MM on a QB who only completed 55.7% of his passes in college doesn't instill confidence in me..there are too many variablses and intagibles that go into playing effectively at QB.

Stafford has physical tools..but I'm not sold on how he translates them into game situations..

[squid]

great job ed...I was going to disagree with something....but I forgot.

[squid]

hehe, now I remember...on espn radio today on the way home from work....Barry Sanders was good in Detroit because he was God in a Lions uni

[Johnny Mac]

Originally Posted by sportz4life

Not my point..but the fact you are ready to spend 50MM on a QB who only completed 55.7% of his passes in college doesn't instill confidence in me..there are too many variablses and intagibles that go into playing effectively at QB.

Stafford has physical tools..but I'm not sold on how he translates them into game situations..

He completed 61% in his most recent year, which is more important to me than his career numbers. Matt Ryan was under 60% his senior year and look how he is doing.

[DetroitFan]

I'd just like to say that Stafford is NOT the best player in the draft. He may have the most potential, but he is not the best player. And imo its not even close.

[Johnny Mac]

Originally Posted by DetroitFan

I'd just like to say that Stafford is NOT the best player in the draft. He may have the most potential, but he is not the best player. And imo its not even close.

Best QB and best player are almost never the same person, but being the best qb can catapult your ranking

[wingnut736]

Originally Posted by sportz4life

Not my point..but the fact you are ready to spend 50MM on a QB who only completed 55.7% of his passes in college doesn't instill confidence in me..there are too many variablses and intagibles that go into playing effectively at QB.

Stafford has physical tools..but I'm not sold on how he translates them into game situations..

You speak of "too many variables (i assume that's what that says), and intangibles (assumption there too), yet the only thing you bring up is completion percentage. I will say right now that I am against drafting a QB, but Stafford is by far the most pro-ready QB in this draft, for reasons other than what his stats may or may not show.

Sure, he may have a 55.7% career passing percentage (I'm going with your number, I'll assume you're correct on that), but how did he do this past year? 61.4%. Are you saying that if an NFL QB passed for 50% his rookie year, then 55%, then 60% with 25 TD/10 int, he isn't worth it because he only averages 55% over the past 3 years? Stafford had one of the worst O-Lines in the SEC, and his only real weapon was his HB. He has a cannon and he doesn't lead his receivers into big hits. He is a big QB who has shown he is extremely durable and can take a hit. He also averaged almost 10 yards per attempt, all while playing against the best defenses in the country.

Do you understand why Chase Daniel, Graham Harrell, Joe Ganz, etc., are not high on any draft boards? Unusually high completion percentages are usually because of the offensive system in place. Stafford plays in a pro-style offense without many weapons. He is going to have pro-style numbers, if he's any good. Well, he's good, and he put up great numbers this past year.

If QB's were drafted based on passing percentage, then Matt Ryan shouldn't have cracked Day One.

[Hongbit]

Originally Posted by DetroitFan

I'd just like to say that Stafford is NOT the best player in the draft. He may have the most potential, but he is not the best player. And imo its not even close.

This doesn't make sense to me. Potential is a key attribute in what makes someone the the best player in a draft. The goal isn't to pick the guy who's the best player at age 21. What good does that do for a pro team. The trick is figuring out how good these guys will be in 2 years, how good they'll be in 4 or 6 and well beyond.

[wingnut736]

Originally Posted by Hongbit

This doesn't make sense to me. Potential is a key attribute in what makes someone the the best player in a draft. The goal isn't to pick the guy who's the best player at age 21. What good does that do for a pro team. The trick is figuring out how good these guys will be in 2 years, how good they'll be in 4 or 6 and well beyond.

Exactly. Are you trying to draft a guy that is going to help the most this season, or 5 years down the road? Free agents are there to make an instant impact. You build a team through the draft and develop the talent you draft. Sure, some guys come in and are amazing right away, but you still want them to get better each year.

[InfanteIago]

I sure hope they take Stafford. He has everything you want in a franchise QB but it's the Lions so I'm not expecting them to take Stafford.

[DetroitFan]

Originally Posted by Hongbit

This doesn't make sense to me. Potential is a key attribute in what makes someone the the best player in a draft. The goal isn't to pick the guy who's the best player at age 21. What good does that do for a pro team. The trick is figuring out how good these guys will be in 2 years, how good they'll be in 4 or 6 and well beyond.

I was just throwing it out there. I hate when people say that he was one of the best QBs in NCAAF. He wasn't, and its not even close.

Not saying it matters for the draft, but he wasn't a top 10 QB in college.

[Mr. Bigglesworth]

Originally Posted by DetroitFan

I was just throwing it out there. I hate when people say that he was one of the best QBs in NCAAF. He wasn't, and its not even close.

Not saying it matters for the draft, but he wasn't a top 10 QB in college.

I don't think anybody claimed Stafford was a top 10 QB in the NCAA in this thread.

Heck, I'm not sure I read anyone claiming that in all of the various threads on this board regarding the topic of Matt Stafford.

[snoogit]

Originally Posted by Edman85

Re: College QB's

Stafford: 57.1%, 31 GS
Sanchez: 64.3%, 16 GS
Freeman: 59.1%, 33 GS
Davis: 60.3%, 34 GS
Harrell: 69.8%, 39 GS

I'm beginning to think Stafford may not be the guy...

By the metrics from the article posted, it looks like Harrell is the only guy worthy of being picked for QB.

[bobb]

http://www.threadpit.com/store/produ...r=01&astyle=01

And scroll down...

[snoogit]

Originally Posted by bobb

http://www.threadpit.com/store/produ...r=01&astyle=01

And scroll down...

I didn't quite make it to the comments section:



(and neither will anyone else)

[djhutch]

If their overall yards per carry are equal, a running back who consistently gains yardage on every play is more valuable than a boom-and-bust running back who is frequently stuffed at the line but occasionally breaks a long highlight-worthy run.

Our brethren at Baseball Prospectus believe that the most precious commodity in baseball is outs. Teams only get 27 of them per game, and you can't afford to give one up for very little return. So imagine if there was a new rule in baseball that gave a team a way to earn another three outs in the middle of the inning. That would be pretty useful, right?

That's the way football works. You may start a drive 80 yards away from scoring, but as long as you can earn 10 yards in four chances, you get another four chances. Long gains have plenty of value, but if those long gains are mixed with a lot of short gains, you are going to put the quarterback in a lot of difficult third-and-long situations. That means more punts and more giving the ball back to the other team rather than moving the chains and giving the offense four more plays to work with.

The running back who gains consistent yardage is also going to do a lot more for you late in the game, when the goal of running the ball is not just to gain yardage but to eat clock time. If you are a Chicago Bears fan watching your team with a late lead, you don't want to see three straight Matt Forte stuffs at the line followed by a punt. You want to see a game-icing first down.

A common historical misconception is that our preference for consistent running backs means that "Football Outsiders believes that Barry Sanders was overrated." Sanders wasn't just any boom-and-bust running back, though; he was the greatest boom-and-bust runner of all time, with bigger booms and fewer busts. Our play-by-play database only goes back to 1995, but Sanders led the league in rushing DYAR for 1996 and was second behind Terrell Davis in 1997.

I like the fact that they included this little caveat at the end about Barry, because I was thinking exactly what they said I was thinking. I worry that stat-heads get so caught up in what the stats say that they don't allow for exceptions. This does not seem to the be case. Reading this has really warmed me to Schwartz as a HC. Let's hope it translates to wins. If he can turn the Lions around, he deserves a medal.

[nd1377]

Originally Posted by djhutch

Let's hope it translates to wins. If he can turn the Lions around, he deserves a medal.

If he turns the Lions around, he would be the king and/or mayor of Detroit.

[Edman85]

Originally Posted by snoogit

By the metrics from the article posted, it looks like Harrell is the only guy worthy of being picked for QB.

But they also point out system QB's, such as former Mike Leach QB Tim Couch.

[Edman85]

Originally Posted by djhutch

I like the fact that they included this little caveat at the end about Barry, because I was thinking exactly what they said I was thinking. I worry that stat-heads get so caught up in what the stats say that they don't allow for exceptions. This does not seem to the be case. Reading this has really warmed me to Schwartz as a HC. Let's hope it translates to wins. If he can turn the Lions around, he deserves a medal.

This isn't an exception. The stats say Barry was great despite the boom/bust style.

[snoogit]

Originally Posted by Edman85

But they also point out system QB's, such as former Mike Leach QB Tim Couch.

It also states that Couch only had 26 games started vs. Harrell who has 39.

Which means that even though the system isn't perfect, it might produce some fluky results too (which it alludes to as well)

[Edman85]

Originally Posted by snoogit

It also states that Couch only had 26 games started vs. Harrell who has 39.

Which means that even though the system isn't perfect, it might produce some fluky results too (which it alludes to as well)

Yeah, it's not hard and fast, and only applies to picks in the top two rounds, so system QB's like Harrell and Brennan are eliminated.

On an unrelated note, I just found out Schwartz doesn't have any son-in-laws, so we don't have to worry about that.